Given the many comments and the fact that a few of the respondents have 
stated that they don't read Italian, and that others either don't or haven't 
visited the Filippini site, let me summarize--very succinctly-- a few of the "facts"
that are stated in that site. http://www.cefalonia.it/

[RAA NOTE: British General Mac Farlane, the Allied High Commissioner DENIED 
permission to the Italian Navy to steam to the rescue of the Italians on 
Cefalonia.]
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CEFALONIA

The Italian Acqui Division of roughly 10,000 men, under General Antonio
Gandin,  had occupied the island of Cefalonia starting in 1941. During the
first week of August of 1943, approximately 2000 German soldiers arrived. In
theory they were there to complement the Italian troops. In reality they
were there to keep an eye on them. Hitler no longer trusted his Italian
allies now under the leadership of Marshall Pietro Badoglio, after the
deposition of Mussolini on 25 July 1943.

On 9 September, after the signing of the Armistice with the Allies (3
September 1943), Gen. Gandin received an order to turn all his crew served
and heavy weapons over to the Germans. Because this order was not in
accordance with the status of forces agreement between Italy and Germany,
Gandin requested clarifications.  On13 September a new order arrived:
"resist with your weapons the German request that you turn your weapons over
to them."  The Italian High Command added, "Impossible to send the help you
request. Inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy. Every sacrifice
you make will be rewarded."  The Germans did not react immediately; instead
they brought reinforcements to the island.

Italy did not declare war on Germany until 13 October.  This meant that the
Germans considered the Italian soldiers as partisans and thus subject to
execution.  On 29 September, during a meeting on Malta, General Eisenhower
asked Marshall Badoglio, "Do you realize that they (those soldiers) can be
executed?"  Marshall Badoglio replied, "Without a doubt."  General
Eisenhower: ". . .to defend those men, in the sense of making them become
regular combatants, it would much more convenient for Italy to declare war."

By the time of this conversation, unbeknownst to the brass on Malta,
however, it was too late for the men on Cefalonia. Without receiving orders
from Gen. Gandin, on or around 15 September, a certain Captain Apollonio and
some other junior officers ordered their soldiers to open fire on a couple
of German barges that were bringing food and equipment to the island. The
Italian command group ordered a cease fire and succeeded in being obeyed
only after considerable effort.

On 15 September, as Gen. Gandin had predicted, the Germans attacked the
Italian infantry with Stukas dive bombers while their own soldiers stayed
under cover.  The Italians resisted until 22 September. During this period
roughly 2000 Italian soldiers were killed.  Seeing that resistance was
useless, Gen. Gandin ordered his men to surrender. Between 22 and 25
September the Germans took their revenge. They executed (perhaps slaughtered
would be a better word) 4000 Italian soldiers, among them Gen. Gandin.  To
show his indignation, the latter threw to the ground the Iron Cross Hitler
himself had awarded him for battlefield heroism one year earlier.

The Italian navy, under Admiral Galati, upon receiving calls from help from
the island, proposed to  to steam to the rescue of the men on Cefalonia, in
violation of the Armistice agreement which required that all movements of
Italian ships be approved by the Allied High Command. The Italian ships set
sail. However, they were called back by British General Mac Farlane, the
Allied High Commissioner.

The Germans then put the remaining Italian soldiers on ships with the intent
of sending them to German forced labor camps.  Unfortunately three of the
ships ran into mines and 3000 more Italians died.  The final number of
Italian dead was 9,646.

According to Filippini "the Badoglio government needed them to fight at any
cost; it needed those dead to try to compel the Allies  to recognize his
government and to play that bloody card in favor of the futilely invoked
alliance."  Marshall Alexander and Admiral Cunningham defined what happened
at Cefalonia as an "insane, useless fight."

Fillipini states that while the "accusatory finger has always been pointed
only at the Germans as butchers, role which is congenial to them, they did
so subsequent to actions whose responsibility falls on others."

He goes on to say that the tragedy was buried by post-war Italian
governments and in particular as a result of manipulations by the left.