The ANNOTICO Report
There were many of us who felt the basis of Invading Iraq
were absolutely
"contrived", and it was a case of Bush & Blair
determining that was what
they wanted to do, and then "manufacturing" evidence
to justify it. (Did I
hear hear someone say "Fraudulent Nigerian Uranium documents"?
OR
"Manipulated/Manufactured Intelligence Reports" ?)
Now, a leaked Memo of secret minutes of a top-level British
cabinet meeting
held in July 2002 to discuss Iraq, nine months before
the invasion, in
which Blair was told of Bush intent on Invading Iraq,
and that Policy would
be supported by "fixed" intelligence and facts.
More specifically, Britain's spy chief, Sir Richard Dearlove,
fresh from a
trip to Washington, had concluded that war was "inevitable"
because "Bush
wanted to remove Saddam through military action", and
"INTELLIGENCE AND
FACTS WERE BEING FIXED AROUND THE POLICY". Blair ordered
his chief of
defence staff, Sir Michael Boyce, to present him with
war plans later that
week
The question now becomes, how much was Berlusconi told,
since was obviously
not in on the decision making.
Was he a pawn or a player???
The Article, is followed by the Memo.
From: Full Text: The secret Downing Street memo
By Peter Graff
05/01/05 - (Reuters) - U.S. President George W. Bush and
British Prime
Minister Tony Blair were determined to topple Saddam
Hussein at least nine
months before they launched the war in Iraq, British
documents leaked in a
Sunday newspaper say.
The secret documents could have a late impact in Britain's
election next
Thursday, in which Iraq -- and whether the prime minister
told the truth
when making his case for war -- has resurfaced as an
issue in the final
week of campaigning.
Blair has always maintained that he did not commit Britain
to attacking
Iraq until Saddam had been given a final chance to abandon
banned weapons,
and that "regime change" -- overthrowing Saddam -- was
never his aim.
Despite hostility to Blair over his Iraq policy, polls
show he is likely to
win a third term in the election, though his huge parliamentary
majority is
expected to shrink.
Blair has been careful to say he believes the election
result may still be
in doubt. In an interview with the Observer newspaper,
he urged anti-war
voters not to cast a protest vote.
"There will be people who will feel very, very strongly
over Iraq. But if
they vote Liberal Democrat in a seat where the Conservatives
are second, it
is not policy on Iraq that will change -- it's the policy
on the economy,
on the health service, on schools, on the minimum wage,"
he said.
The Sunday Times printed what it said were secret minutes
of a top-level
cabinet meeting held in July 2002 to discuss Iraq, nine
months before the
invasion.
According to the minutes, Blair spoke to his cabinet explicitly
in terms of
toppling Saddam.
"If the political context were right, people would support
regime change,"
Blair is recorded as saying. "The two key issues were
whether the military
plan worked and whether we had the political strategy
to give the military
plan the space to work."
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said the case for war was
"thin" because
"Saddam was not threatening his neighbours and his WMD
(weapons of mass
destruction) capability was less than that of Libya,
North Korea or Iran."
Straw proposed giving Saddam an ultimatum to allow in
U.N. weapons
inspectors, provoking a confrontation that would "help
with the legal
justification for the use of force."
Britain's spy chief, Sir Richard Dearlove, fresh from
a trip to Washington,
had concluded that war was "inevitable" because "Bush
wanted to remove
Saddam through military action", and "intelligence and
facts were being
fixed around the policy".
Blair ordered his chief of defence staff, Sir Michael
Boyce, to present him
with war plans later that week, the minutes said.
IRAQ SLOW TO EMERGE AS ELECTION ISSUE
Although many in Britain opposed the war, it has been
slow to emerge as an
election issue because both Blair's Labour party and
the main opposition
Conservatives backed it.
But the Conservatives have used the case Blair made for
war to attack his
credibility, and they hope some traditionally left-leaning
Labour party
supporters will swing to the anti-war third party, the
Liberal Democrats.
The Sunday Times document was the second major Iraq leak
to emerge in the
final week before the election. Last week Channel Four
news leaked advice
to Blair in which the attorney general raised doubts
about whether the war
would be legal.
Blair's Downing Street office declined to comment on whether
the minutes
leaked to the Sunday Times were genuine, but said the
meeting took place
before the U.N. Security Council resolution that provided
the basis for
Blair's case for war.
"This was before the decision to go down the U.N. route,
and before
resolution 1441 on which the attorney general based his
judgment," a
spokeswoman said. "The circumstances therefore quickly
became out of date."
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/
article8708.htm
05/01/05 "Sunday Times"
The secret Downing Street memo
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General,
Sir Richard
Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan
Powell, Sally
Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies
should be made. It
should be shown only to those with a genuine need to
know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC
assessment.
Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear.
The only way to
overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action.
Saddam was
worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land,
but he was not
convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming.
His regime expected
their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew
that regular army
morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public
was probably
narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was
a perceptible shift
in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable.
Bush wanted to
remove Saddam, through military action, justified by
the conjunction of
terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were
being fixed around
the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route,
and no enthusiasm
for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record.
There was little
discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military
action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on
1-2 August, Rumsfeld
on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops,
a short (72
hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the
south. Lead time of
90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment
to Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x
6,000), continuous
air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total
lead time of 60 days
with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous
option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing
in Diego Garcia
and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other
Gulf states were
also important, but less vital. The three main options
for UK involvement
were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000,
perhaps with a
discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey,
tying down two Iraqi
divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun
"spikes of
activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions
had been taken, but
he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military
action to begin
was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before
the US
Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with
Colin Powell this
week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind
to take military
action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the
case was thin.
Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD
capability was less
than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work
up a plan for an
ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors.
This would
also help with the legal justification for the use of
force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change
was not a legal
base for military action. There were three possible legal
bases:
self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation.
The first
and second could not be the base in this case. Relying
on UNSCR 1205 of
three years ago would be difficult. The situation might
of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference
politically and
legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors.
Regime change and
WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that
was producing the
WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with
Libya and Iran. If
the political context were right, people would support
regime change. The
two key issues were whether the military plan worked
and whether we had the
political strategy to give the military plan the space
to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the
US battleplan was
workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of
questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used
WMD on day one, or
if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began?
You said that
Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel,
added the Defence
Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead
with a military
plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy.
On this, US and UK
interests converged. But on the political strategy, there
could be US/UK
differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore
discreetly the
ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with
the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors
back in only
when he thought the threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister
wanted UK military
involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned
that many in
the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum
route. It would be
important for the Prime Minister to set out the political
context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would
take part in any
military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US
planning before we
could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US
military that we were
considering a range of options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of
whether funds could
be spent in preparation for this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of
the proposed military
campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of
the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister
the background on
the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum
to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions
of countries
in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member
states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General
would
consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)
Copyright 2005 Times Newspapers Ltd.