Friday,
August 18, 2006
Italy
and Ethiopia
- Hypocrisy in History
War is great
until you lose, then you cry "victim" !!!!!!!
From the time of
its establishment in the thirteenth century, the Christian kingdom of Abyssinia
(Ethiopia)
was fundamentally a warrior society. Both the Amhara
and the Tigray, the two dominant peoples of the
kingdom, were imbued with a military ethos that placed great value on
achievement in battle and the spoils to be gained thereby. Generally,
soldiering has been the sure! st
path to social advancement and economic reward in Ethiopia.
Warriors
traditionally gave allegiance to that commander who could assure the fruits of
victory to his followers, rather than to an abstract notion of the state or to
government authority. The army's
command structure, like the nation's
social structure, resembled a pyramid with the emperor at its apex as supreme
military leader. In the field, a hierarchy of warlords led the army.
Often, soldiers
turned to brigandage. During Emperor Menelik II's reign
(1889-1913), for example, many Ethiopians complained that soldiers "eat,
drink, sleep, and grow fat at the expense of what the poor have." Popular
feeling against the military was strong in newly conquered territories, where
at least a portion of the army would settle as colonists. The granting of
tracts of conquered land to soldiers survived into the 1930s. Soldiers
benefiting from this system became the landlords and the tax collectors in
areas they had conquered. Not surprisingly, the army's
demands on local populations often prompted rebellions.
It was into this
"Utopia" that was built on a "Warrior"
system that flourished on taking from the "losers, and the weak,
that the Italian Army marched into in 1935, and then the Warriors
COMPLAIN because they lost. Such Hypocrisy!!!!!!!!
Furthermore, There was no Italian colonization of Ethiopia during this period, since the
Italians purposefully occupied only a few key cities and major routes, while
most of Ethiopia
was not affected by their presence. The Italian period is thus considered an
"occupation" and not colonial rule.
Interestingly
enough Italy had sovereignty
over Eritrea (A northern
most portion of historical Ethiopia) under
the Treaty of Uccialli (May 2, 1889), and Italian Somaliland (to the South of Ethiopia)
originated in 1889, when Italy
concluded agreements with two local rulers, who placed their territories under
Italian protection, rather than be subject to French or British
Colonialism.
Both Eritrea and Somalia benefited greatly from the
Italian "paternalistic" presence that required large subsidization,
and that introduced a number of reforms, and gave those areas greater economic
status than their neighbors, who instead were being "exploited"
by their European "rulers".
After WWII, Italy lost all rights in East Africa, and Eritrea and Ethiopia were federated, as
were Italian and British Somililand,
Almost
immediately there was discontent that fostered a civil work that broke out, in Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1963 and 1993, and
then again in 1998 to 2000, with UN forces still today acting as a buffer.
In 1960, an
independent Somali
Republic was proclaimed.
Somalia was formed by a merger of two former colonial territories: British
Somaliland, in the north, and its larger and more populous neighbor, Italian
Somaliland, with representatives of the two component territories forming
a tenuous fractious government that hardly avoided civil war until 1991,
when Somalia was riven by battles for territory
between armed groups, mostly divided along clan lines.There
was the Isaaq clan, to which the majority of the
population in "'Somaliland"
belong, the Habr Yunis
clan, the Issa Musa sub-clan, and others along with
intra clan clashes. It was in this environment that the US beat a hasty
retreat with "Black Hawk Down". In January 1992 the UN stepped in and
has been there ever since.
Currently there
is the fighting along the along the
Ethiopian-Sudanese border between the Ethiopian army and forces loyal to an
armed separatist movement, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The OLF evolved
from a political party into an armed movement nine years ago, claiming that the
rights of the Oromo people - who make up almost 40% of Ethiopia's 65 million - were not being respected. The OLF
are now fighting Prime Minister Meles Zenawi's
government for the independence of the Oromia region
from the rest of Ethiopia.
So lets put to rest the myth that Italy intruded
on a "Paradise"
History is a
Series of Lies, and Damn Lies!!!!!
THE CHRISTIAN KINGDOM
OF AMHARA AND TIGRAY WERE FUNDAMENTALLY A
WARRIOR SOCIETY
An Eye on the
Horn of African Affairs
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda
...Wars, insurrections, and rebellions have punctuated Ethiopia's
history. Kings and nobles raised and maintained armies to defend the
"Christian island" against Muslim invasion or to conquer neighboring
territories. Even after consolidation of centralized authority under "Solomonic" emperors in the thirteenth century,
subordinate neguses (kings) and powerful nobles, some
of whom later carried the high military title of ras
(roughly, marshal; literally, head in Amharic), ruled different regions of the
kingdom and commanded their own armies as they struggled for power and
position.
According to a seventeenth-century European, only
nature could temper the bellicosity of the Ethiopians, whom he described as
"a warlike people and continually exercised in war" except during
respites "caused by the winter, at which time by reason of inundation of
the rivers they are forced to be quiet."
From the time of its establishment in the thirteenth century, the Christian kingdom of Abyssinia
(Ethiopia)
was fundamentally a warrior society. Both the Amhara
and the Tigray, the two dominant peoples of the
kingdom, were imbued with a military ethos that placed great value on
achievement in battle and the spoils to be gained thereby. Military values
influenced the political, economic, and social organization of the Christian
kingdom, while senior state officers often bore military titles. Additionally,
military symbolism and themes occur frequently in Amhara
and Tigray art, literature, and folklore of the
period. Ot! her ethnic groups, particularly the Galla,
also had warrior traditions and admired courage in combat, although the social
systems that encouraged these values differed substantially from those of the Amhara and the Tigray.
Generally, soldiering has been the surest path to social advancement and economic
reward in Ethiopia.
Kings and nobles traditionally awarded land, titles, and political appointments
to those who proved their loyalty, competence, and courage on the battlefield.
As a result, warriors traditionally gave allegiance to that commander who could
assure the fruits of victory to his followers, rather than to an abstract
notion of the state or to government authority.
In early times, the army's command
structure, like the nation's social
structure, resembled a pyramid with the emperor at its apex as supreme military
leader. In the field, a hierarchy of warlords led the army. Each was
subordinate to a warlord of a higher rank and commanded oth!
ers at a lower rank
according to a system of vertical personal loyalties that bound them all to the
emperor. At each command level, the military drew troops from three sources.
Each warlord, from the emperor to a minor noble, had a standing corps of armed
retainers that varied in size according to the leader's
importance. Many landholders also served several months each year in the local
lord's retinue in lieu of paying
taxes. Most troops, however, came from the mass of able-bodied adult freemen,
clergy alone excepted, who could be summoned by proclamation on an ad hoc basis
when and where their service was required.
Each man provided his own weapon and was expected to acquire skill in its use
on his own initiative. He brought his own food for the march or foraged en
route. Often a soldier brought his wife or a female servant to cook and tend
mules. Indeed, the authorities recognized women as an integral part of the
Ethiopian army insofar as many officers believed! that
their presence discouraged cowardice among the men. More important, women
formed an unofficial quartermaster corps because men believed it was beneath
their dignity to prepare food.
In an environment in which war was the government's
regular business, the mobile army camp became the capital of its leader,
whether emperor, negus, or ras.
Only rarely before the late nineteenth century did a ruler maintain his court
at a fixed location throughout the year. Constantly moving over his domain, a
ruler took his court with him, issuing laws and decrees from the army camp,
collecting and consuming taxes paid in kind, and supervising trade. So integrated
was military command with government that army officers also functioned in
civil capacities.
The organization of military camps remained virtually unchanged for centuries.
In the royal camp, the emperor's
tent, customarily pitched on an elevation, marked the center of the encampment.
The tents of his imme! diate retinue surrounded the royal tent. The
bodyguard was posted in front of the camp, thus indicating the direction of march. The highest ranking subordinate in the royal army was
the dejazmatch (general of the door), who was in
charge of the center of the battle formation. The gannazmatch
(general of the right wing) and the gerazmatch
(general of the left wing) and their troops camped to the right and left,
respectively. At the rear of the main encampment was the rear guard, whose
commander usually was a trustworthy counselor and the leader's chief minister. Subordinate warlords and their
troops camped around the emperor's
compound in small-scale replicas of the royal camp. The advance guard was a
standard feature of this mobile army, and in times of war it might travel
several days' march ahead of the
main body.
Although infantrymen made up the bulk of the army, cavalry participated in most
military operations. The standard attack formation was a crescent-shap! ed
mass of foot soldiers in which both wings advanced to outflank and envelop the
enemy's defenses. Once engaged, the
individual soldier was the army's
basic fighting unit, and a final charge to bring the enemy to hand-to-hand
combat usually decided a battle. Mutilating slain enemies and abandoning the
wounded and dead on the battlefield were accepted practices.
Leadership, especially among emperors and powerful nobles, was intensely
personal, and commanders at all levels led their men in combat. Success or
failure often depended on the leader's
fate; upon his death, whole armies frequently scattered and fled.
The army lived off the ruler's
subjects wherever it camped in his domain. When troops exhausted food and
firewood, they struck their tents and moved on. Often, soldiers turned to
brigandage. During Emperor Menelik II's reign
(1889-1913), for example, many Ethiopians complained that soldiers "eat,
drink, sleep, and grow fat at the expense of what! the
poor have." Popular feeling against the military was strong in newly
conquered territories, where at least a portion of the army would settle as
colonists. The granting of tracts of conquered land to soldiers survived into
the 1930s. Soldiers benefiting from this system became the landlords and the
tax collectors in areas they had conquered. Not surprisingly, the army's demands on local populations often prompted
rebellions.
The titles of rank in the traditional military system indicated position in
society at large. Soldiers won promotions--and therefore enhancement of their
social status--by demonstrating military ability. Titles were not inherited,
and distinctions had to be earned. Even those starting at the bottom of the
social scale could attain wealth and position if they could draw attention to
themselves by displays of loyalty, valor, and ruthlessness. The traditional
system's strength and weakness lay
in the fact that every warrior strove to become ! great and as such saw himself the potential equal of the
greatest warrior or noble.
Modernization of the Ethiopian army started during the regency of Tafari Mekonnen (who took the
throne name of Haile Selassie
I when crowned emperor in 1930). In 1917 he formed the Imperial Bodyguard as a
regular standing force, recruiting into it some Ethiopian veterans of the
British campaign in German East Africa (present-day Tanzania). The regent also hired
foreign officers to develop training programs (see Training, this ch.). In the 1920s, he sent Ethiopian officers to the
French military academy at Saint- Cyr and arranged for a Belgian military
mission to train the Imperial Bodyguard. In January 1935, with Swedish
assistance, Ethiopia
established a military school at Holeta to turn out
officers qualified in modern techniques. The first class, which had been
scheduled to complete a sixteen- month course, never graduated because of
mounting tensions with Ethiopia's
nemesis, It! aly, this time under the fascist
leadership of Benito Mussolini.
When Mussolini's
forces crossed into Ethiopia
from the Italian colony of Eritrea
and from Italian Somaliland in 1935,
provincial armies raised by the nobility moved and fought against the
mechanized Italian forces in traditional fashion. Haile
Selassie's
mobilization order typified the Ethiopian way of waging war: everyone would be
mobilized, and all males old enough to carry a spear would be sent to Addis Ababa. Married men
would bring their wives to carry food and to cook. Those without wives would
take any woman without a husband. Women with small babies were not required to
go. Men who were blind or who could not carry a spear were exempted.
At the time of the Italian invasion, the regular Ethiopian army had only a few
units trained in European warfare and led by officers schooled in modern
fighting. These included the Imperial Bodyguard and the Harer
garrison. About 5,000 strong in ! combat
against the Italians, many of these troops failed to implement tactics they had
learned during training exercises. Most of the army that opposed the Italian
invasion consisted of traditional warriors from the provincial militia, armed
with spears and obsolete rifles and led by the provincial nobility. Even the
25,000-member regular army marched barefoot and lacked a logistical support
system. By early 1936, the Italians--who used air power with deadly
accuracy--had inflicted a severe defeat on the Ethiopians.
After the country's liberation in
1941, Haile Selassie
started to transform Ethiopia
into a centralized monarchical state. The creation of a strong national army
was an important part of that transformation. The imperial regime abolished the
ancient military hierarchy and abandoned the traditional method of raising
armies by provincial levies. In 1942 the emperor signed a military convention
with London
under which the British government agreed to prov! ide a military mission to assist
in organizing and training an army that would be capable of restoring order
throughout the country. Under the terms of the convention, the British assumed
responsibility for policing Addis
Ababa and for exercising military control over the
country's principal towns (see
Foreign Military Assistance, this ch.).
Another aspect of Haile Selassie's transformation strategy was the creation
of the Territorial Army, whose mission was to disarm the numerous guerrilla
bands that were roaming the countryside after the war and engaging in banditry.
The emperor authorized the recruitment of many shifta
(bandits) into the Territorial Army, provided they brought their weapons with
them. The Territorial Army was never anything more than a
loosely organized auxiliary forces; when and where it existed, it served
mostly to aid in local police work and not in national defense.
In the immediate postwar period, the Ethiopian government expe!
nded about 40 percent of its
annual budget on defense and internal security. Haile
Selassie also diversified his sources of foreign
military assistance. Over several years, he appointed Swedish officers to train
Ethiopia's air force, asked Norwegian naval personnel to
organize and develop a small coastal navy, signed a military assistance
agreement with the United
States, invited Israeli advisers to train
paratroopers and counterinsurgency units, and arranged for an Indian military
mission to staff the faculty of the military academy at Harer.
During this period, a number of Ethiopian officers attended military schools in
the United States, Britain, and Yugoslavia (see Training, this ch.).
After their modernization, Ethiopia's security forces saw action in several foreign
conflicts. For example, upon the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, Haile Selassie raised a volunteer
battalion from the Imperial Bodyguard and authorized its deployment to Korea with the
U! nited Nations (UN)
forces. The Kagnew Battalion, as the unit was known,
reached Korea
the next year and joined the United States Seventh Division. Before the 1953
cease-fire, three Ethiopian battalions, totaling 5,000 men, had rotated to Korea, where
they fought with distinction.
From 1960 to 1964, some 3,000 Imperial Bodyguard personnel- -about 10 percent
of the Ethiopian army's entire
strength at that time--and part of an air force squadron served with the UN
peacekeeping force in the Congo (present-day Zaire). In 1967 four Ethiopian air
force F-86 fighter-bombers were deployed to Zaire
to help dislodge a concentration of European mercenaries fighting there on
behalf of secessionists in Katanga
Province (present-day
Shaba Region).
The reforms instituted by Haile Selassie,
including the establishment of a relatively large professional standing army,
separated military and civilian functions in a way that was unique in the
country's history. By 1974 m! uch of the population maintained
an ambivalent attitude toward the reorganized and modernized military establishment.
On the one hand, civilians, many of whom were university students, often
complained that the military drained the national budget and failed to help the
country develop. On the other hand, many Ethiopians expressed pride in the
armed forces' ability to maintain
the country's territorial integrity.
Much of the civilian sector also believed that the military represented the
best chance for change in Ethiopia.
After the 1974 revolution, the Provisional Military Administrative Council
(PMAC; also known as the Derg--see Glossary)
designated the armed forces as the "vanguard of the revolution" and
apparently had expectations that military personnel would become involved in
social and economic development programs. The drain on manpower and mat?iel caused by the wars in Eritrea, Tigray, and the Ogaden prevented
the realization of this objective. However, ! military cadres became active in peasant associations,
political organizing, drought relief, and other duties once assigned to the
regular police. The army also undertook projects to improve the country's transportation infrastructure.
Despite the repressiveness of the Mengistu regime,
public demonstrations of discontent with the armed forces grew in frequency in
the 1980s. The army's inability to
achieve victory in Eritrea
and Tigray disillusioned many who had supported the
1974 revolution, and the conflicts in north- central Ethiopia caused divisions within
the military itself. On May 16, 1989, a group of senior officers attempted a
coup against President Mengistu. The coup failed, but
it was a key factor in the fall of the military government in late May 1991.
Dr. Pankhurst: Ethiopia,
as I see it, has suffered excessively from foreign aggression, and resultant
looting... It is of course impossible to bring back what was stolen or
destroyed in earlier wa! rs, but the loot taken by the
British expedition to Maqdala in 1857-8 can easily be
identified, and should be restored to Ethiopia. It is my belief that the
British Expedition had, in international law, no justification whatsoever for
looting Tewodros's
citadel, and that the looting of the church
of Medhane Alem was in fact an act of
sacrilege.
As far as the loot from Maqdala is concerned, we have
founded AFROMET, the Association for the Return of Maqdala
Ethiopian Treasures. This, is interested in justice, and is not
"anti"- anybody: So far from being anti-British, one of its recent
meetings was hosted by the British Council in Addis Ababa, and its supporters include none
other than the Mayor of London, the renowned Mr Ken
Livingstone.
AFROMET believes that even if we fail (which we won't!)
our efforts will have been valuable in educating the Ethiopian public to the
importance of the country's historic
culture, and the need to look after it much better than is being done at
present.
You ask if Ethiopians are doing enough in the struggle for their cultural heritage? Of course they are not! In any great or historic
struggle for justice not enough is ever done, but this does not prevent the
ultimate victory of the cause of Justice.
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