Thursday, August 31,

Italians Humanity Makes Them Better "Peace Keepers" than Americans, British, or French

The ANNOTICO Report

 

Retired Italian General Fabio Mini, former commander of the southern front for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, commanded the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR), wrote  "The War After the War".

 

Mini feels that the Italians have an advantage in any "peace keeping role", in that the Italians are considered by local populaces  to be more humane and nicer than the Americans or the British, or even the French. This is also why the Italian force, which was part of the international force in Beirut after Lebanon War I, was not attacked, whereas both the Americans and the French lost hundreds of soldiers in terror attacks. "Our officers moved around in Beirut; the French and the Americans shut themselves into their bases and then the population began to relate to them as a foreign, occupying force and they started to relate to the population as enemies. This must not happen."

However in Iraq, the Italians lost some of their naivete. "The fact that you are defined as a 'peace force' can cause you to think that your aim is to distribute chocolate to children. The Italian soldiers forgot there were dangers out there, until they suffered a bad terror attack in Nasriya [in November, 2003]. Now the Italians, too, understand that it is important to be nice but that they mustn't forget that the aim of these forces is to maintain security, and in order to maintain security it is necessary to demonstrate strength as well."

 

'THE AIM OF A PEACE FORCE IS NOT TO HAND OUT CHOCOLATES' 

Haaretz

By Meron Rapoport

August 30, 2006

 
ROME - When the radio interviewer asked General Fabio Mini about "our children" who are being sent to Lebanon, the Italian general got angry. "They are soldiers. They are perhaps all of 26 or 27, but they have already participated in a number of international forces abroad, in Kosovo, in Bosnia, in Afghanistan and in Iraq. They are experienced. There is no need to relate to them as children."

General Mini knows what he is talking about. He was the commander of the southern front for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and for a year he commanded the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR), a force of tens of thousands of soldiers maintains order in Kosovo on behalf of the United Nations. About two years ago Mini retired from the army, and since then has become one of the most sought-after experts on military force in the Italian media. He has a regular column in the newspaper La Repubblica and some time ago his book "The War After the War" came out, which won good review! s.

An Italian force of 2,000 to 3,000 soldiers is slated to be a key element in the upgraded United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). It is not yet clear who will command this force. In the meantime, it is headed by a French general, Alain Pellegrini. The French want the command to remain in their hands, especially after this weekend when they announced that they will send 2,000 soldiers to the force. However, in the Italian press it has been reported that the command will be transferred to the Italians upon the completion of Pellegrini's tour of duty in February, 2007.

The Italian candidate for heading the force is General Fabrizio Castagnetti, who is currently serving as the commander of the NATO rapid deployment force. Italian Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema has repeatedly said that it is "not important" who heads the force, and the Italian soldiers will obey anyone who commands them. However, it is clear Italy very much wants the leadership. This ! is supposed to be its recompense for pushing Europe almost single-handedly to send 7,000 soldiers to Lebanon.

Lessons of Kosovo

In Kosovo, Mini was the commander of an army in every respect. Kosovo was a province in Serbia that enjoyed autonomy, as the majority of its population is of Albanian origin. At the end of the 1980s the Serbian government revoked the province's autonomous status and at the end of the 1990s the Serbs began to slaughter its Albanian inhabitants. In April, 1999, NATO bombed Serbia for 73 days, until it agreed to transfer Kosovo to the control of the UN. KFOR was the only military force in Kosovo. It belongs to NATO but operates under the auspices of the UN, and its mission is to preserve order. Among other things, it was charged with disarming the militias.

Mini, who commanded the force for a year, from October 2002 to October 2003, says KFOR carried out this mission successfully. "We destroyed hundreds of thousands of rifle! s - there was a plant there that throughout all those years engaged only in destroying rifles," says Mini. But the disarming was done willingly, after an agreement with the Albanian militias that had previously fought against the Serbian regime. Some of the militia men were absorbed into the civil defense force that was allowed to bear arms ("Have you ever seen firefighters with weapons?" asks Mini. "In Kosovo, the firemen have rifles.") Others received jobs in the local government. A small number of them, a few hundred fighters, continued with terror actions, and Mini commanded several arrests. Some members of his force were killed, but not many.

While Mini succeeded in disarming the militias, he failed in another key aim delegated to the UN force in Kosovo: bringing the refugees back home. Some 80,000 Albanian refugees returned; the 250,000 Serbian refugees who fled after the fall of the Serbian army have not yet returned to their homes. Every time the UN has tried t! o bring Serbian refugees back home, says Mini, the Albanian inhabitants have reacted with violence and the UN has folded. It doesn't want trouble.

From his experience in Kosovo, Mini has learned two things, which somewhat contradict each other. The first: In order to succeed, an independent force is needed, like his force in Kosovo. The second: In order to succeed, agreements must be reached with the local inhabitants. As noted, the disarming of the militias could not have been possible without such agreements.

Looking at UN Security Council Resolution 1701, Mini fears UNIFIL force there will not be sufficiently independent. "The authority given to the force in Lebanon under the resolution is too little," says Mini. "It is good for a passive force, not for a force that wants to be active. I was able to do things independently - house searches, even imposing curfews. The definition of the mission of the force in Lebanon is 'to help the Lebanese government.' Ther! efore, it will need the authorization of the government of Lebanon for every action it takes. Even if members of the force see Hezbollah people on the way to launching rockets on Israel, they will have to get the authorization of the Lebanese government to 'help them' stop them."

Mini believes it is possible to surmount this obstacle, however. The important thing, he says, is this force's ability to reach agreement with the government of Lebanon. In Kosovo, too, says Mini, a large part of the force's authority was obtained through negotiations with the Albanian inhabitants' civilian and political leaders. The moment there was agreement on the force's authority, it was able to go beyond the limited mandate it had been given in the UN resolution. True, this means it will be very difficult to disarm Hezbollah, because Hezbollah is not part of the Lebanese government. But even in Kosovo, where the UN force had full authority, it succeeded in disarming the militias only aft! er it had come to an agreement with them.

Must be strong

For the new UNIFIL to be effective, says Mini, it is first necessary for it to be strong. This force will need combat helicopters, patrol helicopters, mortars and even anti-tank missiles in order to hit Hezbollah missile launchers if necessary. The force must not appear weak in the eyes of the inhabitants. A lot, says Mini, also depends on the commander of the force. He must be of high rank and have status so that he will be able to deal as an equal with the Lebanese chief of staff and the Israeli chief of staff. "It is very bad that today the commander of UNIFIL is not cooperating with [Chief of Staff Dan] Halutz. Israel is part of the story. Calm in the north also depends on it," says Mini.

As noted, it is not yet known who will head the force. Mini thinks an Italian general can definitely do the work. He is aware that the Italian army does not have a particularly good reputation as a figh! ting army, but he is convinced it has acquired many skills in the missions in which it has participated in recent years, from Kosovo to Iraq. The Italians' advantage, says Mini, is that they are considered to be more humane and nicer than the Americans or the British, or even the French. This is also why the Italian force, which was part of the international force in Beirut after Lebanon War I, was not attacked, whereas both the Americans and the French lost hundreds of soldiers in terror attacks. "Our officers moved around in Beirut; the French and the Americans shut themselves into their bases and then the population began to relate to them as a foreign, occupying force and they started to relate to the population as enemies. This must not happen."

In the meantime, says Mini, the Italians have lost their naivete. "The fact that you are defined as a 'peace force' can cause you to get confused and to think that your aim is to distribute chocolate to children. In Iraq t! he Italian soldiers forgot there were dangers out there," says Mini, "until they suffered a bad terror attack in Nasriya [in November, 2003]. Now the Italians, too, understand that it is important to be nice but that they mustn't forget that the aim of these forces is to maintain security, and in order to maintain security it is necessary to demonstrate strength as well."

And will the Italian public be prepared to take losses in Lebanon?

Mini: "If you ask me, it will say it will not. But in the end it will come to terms with the dead. It will understand that this is part of the reality. This is what happened after Italians were killed in Iraq or in other places. On condition, of course, that they are killed for a real aim, and that they haven't been killed pointlessly, because of foolishness on the part of commanders."

 

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