A long and academic, but interesting essay from an historical
and political perspective.
Like contemporary
America, ancient Rome achieved hegemonic
status in its world system
in the course of just a few generations.
The Energy Publisher
Saturday, November 03, 2007
E. Christian Kopff
Like contemporary America, ancient Rome achieved hegemonic status in its world
system in the course of just a few generations. Two important Roman statesmen,
Cicero (in his speech - In favor of the Manilian Law,- 66 BCE) and Tacitus, in his Life of Agricola,
98 CE), reflected on the implications of empire for their government and
society and the people they dominated. What do their reflections have to
say to contemporary Americans?
Rome suffered its own version
of 9/11 in 88 BCE, when Mithridates VI, king of
Pontus, on the Black Sea, led a revolt against the Roman presence in Asia and massacred 80,000 Roman and Italian businessmen
and traders and their families. The general Sulla was sent to subdue Mithridates;
he defeated and made peace with him. Mithridates
remained at large, a hero in the Near East. He
was defeated by the Roman general Lucullus, but escaped and soon humiliated one
of Lucullus?s lieutenants.
This was the context in which the tribune Manilius
presented a motion to the Tribal Assembly that the command of the war against Mithridates be given to Pompey, who had just cleared the
Mediterranean Sea of pirates, a menace since Rome
had destroyed the power of Rhodes a century
earlier.
Cicero's Speech - In Favor of
the Manilian Law?
In a section on "Imperial
America" in their The Rise of
American Civilization (1927) Charles and Mary Beard wrote that pre-World
War I Americans had no theory of how empire fit with the Constitution. ?They were of course not unaware of the ancient creed, for
they had heard about the theory and practice of Rome. In their school books they had read Pro Lege
Manilia, the panegyric
by Cicero, which summed up in a single sentence the old doctrine of might:
"Do not hesitate for a moment in prosecuting with all your energies a
war to preserve the glory of the Roman name, the safety of our allies, our rich
revenue and the fortunes of innumerable private citizens." (vol, II, pp. 530-1).
Another possible translation
might be: "Therefore consider whether it is right for you to hesitate to
continue to support enthusiastically a war in which we are defending Rome's
reputation as a great power, the safety and security of our allies, the
principal sources of our tax revenues, and the fortunes of a very large number of
individual citizens- all matters intimately connected with our national
interest."[1]
The Beards do not mention
important non-economic aspects of Cicero's
argument, but are right to see in his speech "In Favor of the Manilian Law" an important source for Roman ideas of
imperialism. Cicero, a successful and ambitious politician, who had risen to
the position of praetor- one election away from the consulship -was addressing
the Tribal Assembly from the Rostra in the Roman Forum for the first time.
Clarity and eloquence were required, but this was no time for originality. Cicero's goals would have been like Thomas
Jefferson's in composing the Declaration of Independence. Neither aiming at
originality of principle or sentiment, nor yet copied from any particular
and previous writing, it was intended to be an expression of the American
mind, and to give to that expression the proper tone and spirit called for
by the occasion. (Letter to Henry Lee, May 8, 1825)
Cicero's speech was intended
to be an expression of the Roman mind on Rome's empire, what that empire meant
to Rome, threats to it and the type of leadership it needed to survive. Should Rome continue to wage war against Mithridates of Pontus? If it should, who should lead the
Roman army in that war? The bulk of the oration is divided into three large
sections: the character of the war, its importance, and the right commander.
For our purposes the first and third sections are the most important. The
sentence translated by the Beards is the summary of the first section; Cicero devotes a full
paragraph to each item in the list.
Rome's unique role in the
Mediterranean rested on a number of factors, all of which were threatened by Mithridates.
First was the respect accorded to the Roman name.
That respect was dealt a terrible blow by the 88 BCE massacre. Rome?s
inability to make the mastermind behind that atrocity pay for what he did
continued to threaten Rome?s
position. Twenty-two years was far too long a period to allow Mithridates to live without exacting condign punishment?Cicero
mentions several times that Rome
destroyed Corinth
in 146 for merely verbal disrespect to its citizens.
Next Cicero
discusses the safety and security of Rome's
allies. Rome
had traditionally looked upon its allies as clients, and a good patron watches
over and protects his clients. The Twelve Tables, the oldest Roman law code
(fifth century BCE), threatens a patron who cheats his client with ritual
execution. Many of Rome's most dangerous and
bloody wars began from a defense of allies, including the First and Second
Punic Wars with Carthage
and the wars with Philip V and Antiochus III. Classicist B. L. Ullman's laconic note on this list is
"A mere pretext, of course, for territorial expansion."[2]
However, although the conclusions of both Punic Wars were accompanied by
territorial expansion, there is no good evidence that the wars were begun with
that result in mind. Following the defeat of Philip, Rome
withdrew its troops from Greece
as it had withdrawn its troops from Asia after
the defeat of Antiochus III. There is an ethical dimension to Roman dominion,
base d on the patron-client relationship, and Cicero is quite clear about it.
The next two sections support
Charles Beard?s economic
interpretation of Roman imperialism. Enormous tax revenues from Asia, Cicero states, are the
basis of the "advantage we enjoy in war and the respect accorded us in
peace." It supports the empire, since the taxes of the other provinces
scarcely pay for the cost of ruling them. It is not just a case of protecting
this area from attack, however. The mere threat of attack, not just war, but
the rumor of war causes people to desert salt mines, fields, and ports. As long
as Mithridates is still alive, the potential for
economic disruption places Rome's
entire empire in peril.
This discussion leads to the
class that is responsible for Rome's
tax revenues, the equites or Knights. They collect
the taxes that are the basis of Rome's position
in the first-century Mediterranean. If they
are ruined, the consequences will spread out over the Roman economy. Cicero has a very clear
and not at all naive understanding of the importance of businessmen to Roman
prosperity, both because of the tax revenues they collect and their own
personal contributions. If they are ruined, all of Roman society will be
affected. Cicero
displays a sophisticated grasp of the role of psychology in markets.
As noted, the second section
discusses details of the war that can be passed over for our purposes. It is
noteworthy here, however, that as Lucullus's early military successes drove Mithridates out of the kingdom of Pontus,
the rumor spread that the Romans' real intent in invading was to attack and
plunder one of the wealthiest and most sacred shrines in the east. It would not
be the last time in the Near East that a
combatant who was losing called upon the religion of the people to salvage his
position in what began as a secular conflict.
Cicero's discussion of Pompey in his third section, like his analysis
of the nature of the war, is divided into four headings: his knowledge of
military affairs, his honesty, his prestige, and his good luck. It is the
second and third of these that are important for our theme. Success in a war
with Mithridates would involve not only defeating the
oriental monarch, but restoring stability and prosperity. That required the
confidence of the people of the east in the integrity and ability of the
commander in chief. In praising Pompey earlier in the speech, Cicero
remarked on "the kind of generals we send into other provinces,"
saying that "even if they defend them from the enemy, their entry into the
cities of our allies does not differ much from being sacked by the enemy."
This frank remark was no surprise
to his audience. Cicero's greatest
popular triumph and probably one of the reasons he came in first in the
election results for praetor was his prosecution of the corrupt governor of Sicily, Gaius Verres, in 70. There was a streak of frankness and even
brutal realism in Rome's
thinking about and dealing with its empire that was noticed by the Beards. On
the other hand, for the Roman mainstream, the ethical element was never
missing. Empire was a mutual relationship, like the patron-client
relationship that affected Roman attitudes to empire. The military glory of
senatorial generals and the financial profit of the equestrian order were both
fundamental to understanding what Rome
did. The safety and security of the allies, however, the overseeing and
protection of international clients, was also part and parcel of the Roman
imperial system. This was the reason the Italian cities had not deserted
Rome wh en Hannibal defeated one Roman army after
another, and this was also a reason the memory of Rome?s
empire survived so long in elite and popular memory.
Tacitus- Life of Agricola
This appreciation of the role
of the ethical in imperial patron-client politics survived the
collapse of republic institutions in the age of Augustus and later can be seen
in Tacitus's panegyrical biography of his
father-in-law, Julius Agricola. The traits Cicero posited as essential for a successful
general and found in Pompey are also present in Tacitus's portrait of Agricola.
The positive presentation of Agricola's character and accomplishments is,
however, accompanied by a speech from the British resistance that gives a
vivid picture of the other side of Roman imperialism. The barbarians are given
a chance to speak, and what they have to say makes sense and modifies the
positive picture.
In the year 68 the emperor
Vespasian sent Agricola to Britain
to continue the conquest of the island, which had begun under the emperor
Claudius in 43. Agricola succeeds, using both cultural and military means,
until his most successful battle, which breaks the back of the British
resistance to Rome, arouses the jealousy of the
emperor Domitian, Vespasian's son, who in effect recalls him to Rome in 84. Before the
battle a British commander, Calgacus, makes a speech
to rouse his men for battle. The substance of the speech does not differ much
from the critiques of the dark side of Roman imperialism in Cicero. Corrupt Roman officials are
destroying the economy of Britain
by heavy taxation, so that the British must pay for their own enslavement. The
Romans are licentious as well. The common soldiers rape, while the officers
seduce British women. The wealthy attract Roman avarice, the poor their will to
power. "They alone of all mankind desire wealth and poverty with equal pas
sion. To sacking butchery
and robbery they give the deceptive name of empire. They make a desert and call
it peace."
Tacitus notes of the Britons
that they do not object to standard features of Roman rule, like the draft
and tribute, but resent unfairness. "They have
been broken in to obedience, not to slavery." This is important for
understanding Agricola's success in Britain, which depended on more
than military success. The first thing Agricola did was eliminate corruption
and cronyism from his administration. "By checking abuses in his very
first year as governor, Agricola made the Britons appreciate the advantages of
peace, which, because of the negligence and arbitrary character of previous
governors, was no less feared than war." Tacitus makes it plain,
however, that a strong military presence was as essential for control of Britain as a policy
of high ethical standards in administration.
The most striking, and indeed
shocking, part of Tacitus's analysis of Agricola's success in Britain comes
in chapter 21, on Agricola's cultural policy, which I quote in its entirety:
"The following winter was
consumed in applying the most salutary policies. In order to accustom people
who were scattered and uneducated and therefore inclined to war to peaceful
leisure by means of luxuries, Agricola encouraged individuals and helped
communities to build temples, forums and private homes, praising the
hard-working, and criticizing the lazy. So competition for honors replaced
compulsion. He also educated the sons of local aristocrats in the
liberal arts, and showed such a preference for the natural abilities of the
Britons over the pedantic industry of the Gauls that
they who lately disdained the tongue of Rome
now coveted its eloquence. Hence, too, a liking sprang up for our way of
dressing, and the toga was seen everywhere. Step by step they were led to
what lures men to evil ways, arcades, baths and fancy dinner parties. Those who
knew no better call it civilization, although it was but a part of their
enslavement."
The success of Rome in uniting
first Italy and then much of the Mediterranean under its rule was due initially, of
course, to success in war. Ultimately, however, the growth of
cities and the prestige of Greco-Roman culture was an indispensable means for
the peace and prosperity enjoyed by the subjects of Roman rule. That the
clearest presentation of this policy in Latin literature concludes with the
sarcasm that humanitas was only pars servitutis is shocking. It is difficult to decide whether we are
dealing with truly impressive objectivity or coldhearted cynicism.
Rome and America
Rome is relevant to contemporary America in two
ways. FIRST, Rome was the
high culture best known to the generation of the Founders and remained an
essential part of the liberal arts education given to the leaders of every
generation of American leaders until after World War II. Latin and Roman
literature, history and even architecture have been part of American culture,
politics, and public architecture since the time of the Founding.
SECOND, Rome's situation is strikingly like
our own. Ancient Rome and contemporary America share
traditions of consensual institutions and citizenship. In the course of a few
generations both achieved hegemonic status in their world systems. The
strain the imperial situation put on those institutions and ideals changed them
and even deformed them.
On the other hand, the long
traditions of self-rule and commitment to liberty and even equality put
pressure on the theory and practice of empire. Is it possible to maintain
consensual institutions and ways of life and government while ruling or even
just dominating a large part of the world? / Do Americans need to
accept openly and honestly the loss of local and national freedom in return for
the power, prestige, wealth and influence of empire? / Is
it desirable or even possible to return to the role of a city on a hill, which
"does not go forth to destroy monsters," even if this means watching
the rise of another possibly hegemonic power - China, for instance? Must
Americans relive the history of Rome,
or is it possible to learn from it and enjoy the seemingly incompatible fruits
of freedom at home and de facto hegemony abroad? Whichever of these possible
choices or destinies may be America?s, what does it do in particular
cases?
In 1948, English classicist
Harold Mattingly wrote, ?The Roman
Empire is, in fact, nearer to us spiritually than our own country
in the Middle Ages.?[3]
Considering how successful America
was in the days when the Roman world was an essential part of the schooling of
educated people, does Rome
still have lessons for us today?
Granted that Roman imperialism
was affected by corruption and ambition and at times dominated by them, there
are principles we can gather from the Roman example that may be relevant to America's
current and future situation.
FIRST, there are both economic
and ethical constraints on a viable empire. Like any other business, an
empire must pay for itself. Gloria "prestige and reputation"is
an important aspect of what makes an empire worth striving for and worth
possessing, but the empire must rest on solid revenues, vectigalia
maxima. Moreover, as is
true of any enterprise, the technical aspects of an empire, administrative and
economic, must be grounded on sound ethical principles which are
recognized and respected. Both Cicero and Tacitus express this view very
clearly. As ancient historian Hermann Strasburger put
it, "Justice too is a factor in Realpolitik."[4]
SECOND, the survival of
consensual institutions has historically rested on the preservation and
prosperity of a middle class. Any government, imperial or not, which
subverts the stability of this class will lose the basis for domestic
prosperity and imperial stability. Concern for this class must play a
fundamental role in all governmental deliberations, including those about
foreign affairs and empire.
THIRD, imperial institutions
must interact with domestic institution in the same kind of contrapuntal relationship
of checks and balances that Roman and American statesmen have perceived as
being fundamental to the health and vitality of the domestic systems.
Undermining checks and balances, which will always be urged in times of crisis
and which is often the goal of seeking out crises, has serious and detrimental
long-term affects on the empire and on the nation's domestic institutions and
its way of life.
The American Founders
consistently looked to Roman history among their "lamps of
experience." When planning for an uncertain future, we will be wise to
consider not just the latest theoretical models, but also the lessons of the
past.
Notes
- Cicero, ?On
the Manilian Law,? 7.19: Quare
videte num dubitandum vobis sit omni studio ad id
bellum incumbere in quo gloria
nominis vestri, salus sociorum, vectigalia maxima, fortunae plurimorum civium coniunctae cum re publica defendantur.
- B. L. Ullman, Third
Latin Book (New York, 1930) 296, n. 4
- Harold Mattingly, Tacitus, The Agricola and
the Germania (London,
1979) 12
- Hermann Strasburger, ?Die Entdeckung der politischen Geschichte durch Thukydides,? Saeculum 5 (1954) = Hans Herter, ed., Thukydides (Darmstadt 1968) 452: ?auch die Gerechtigkeit ist ja ein
realpolitischer Faktor.?
E. Christian Kopff
is director of the Center for Western Civilization at the University
of Colorado, Boulder. He is the author of The Devil
Knows Latin: Why America Needs the Classical Tradition. This essay is
based on his talk to FPRI?s
Study Group on America
and the West given September 20, 2007. Published by FPRI.
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