Thursday,
May 21, 2009
"Operation Sunrise" - US-CIA Takes
Two Months to Negotiate German Surrender in Northern Italy in WWII
THE ANNOTICO REPORT
Operation Sunrise was a covert mission
executed by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in the final months
of the Second World War in Europe. From March to May 1945 Allen Dulles,
the OSS chief in Bern, met secretly with a number of German officials headed
by the SS and police chief of northern Italy, SS Obergruppenfuhrer Karl
Wolff, in an effort to arrange the secret surrender of Axis forces in northern
Italy. Talks were long and complicated as controversy grew between the
Western powers and the Soviet Union. Wolff and German generals delayed
in negotiations as they feared retribution from Hitler. Many Americans
are still unaware of the secret surrender of Italy that occurred on May
2, 1945 just five days prior to the final capitulation of all Axis powers
in Europe. Prior to Operation Sunrise, the OSS had not contributed much
to intelligence action in the war. This was the first significant intelligence
operation undertaken by the OSS in Europe. Why did it take TWO MONTHS when
such death and destruction was taking Place
http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/st/~vincent/page1.html
Review of 'Intelligence, War Crimes,
and the Law'
Nazi War Crimes: Intelligence Agencies
and Selective Legal Accountability
.
By Michael Salter
Publisher Abingdon Routledge-Cavendish,
2007
Reviewed by Norman J.W. Goda (Department
of History, Ohio University)
Published on H-German (March, 2009)
One section of the Review focuses
briefly upon Allen Dulles role in WW II and its linkage to the period of
Italian History that German military forces brought about within Italy.
It relates to Dullesand the secret surrender of German police personnel
in Italy.
Intelligence, War Crimes, and the
Law
One of the less understood matters
in postwar justice for National Socialist criminals concerns the degree
to which western intelligence agencies shielded Nazi suspects from prosecution
in return for services rendered during the war or in its immediate aftermath.
Since the 1980s, journalists have argued that the use of former SS and
SD officers by western agencies, the U.S. Army and CIA in particular, was
systematic and directed from the very top. The practice, it was argued,
not only allowed Nazi perpetrators and their east European collaborators
to escape justice, it also accelerated the onset and hardening of the Cold
War, demonstrating as it did to the Soviets that the West would work with
highly placed Nazis.[1] The recent declassification of millions of pages
of OSS, CIA, FBI, Army Counterintelligence, and State Department records
due to the U.S. Congress's passage of the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act
in 1998 tells a more nuanced story and will continue to do so in the years
ahead as more historians sift through the new records and situate them
within older ones. What can be said at present is that the American use
of former Nazi officials, while surely mistaken, was more ad hoc than critics
have suggested. The Soviets, moreover, probably played this game better
than the Americans did, having penetrated West German intelligence with
their own former creatures from the SS, Geheime Feldpolizei, and other
Nazi agencies.[2]
The larger question for Michael
Salter concerns the degree to which intelligence agencies are by nature
a hindrance to postwar justice, since the latter involves the handover
of secret information to judicial agencies and the potential punishment
of informants. The question is as much contemporary as historical, since
today's intelligence agencies enjoy a far greater capability of collecting
evidence of mass atrocities and of locating perpetrators for eventual capture
and trial.[3] But Salter is specifically interested in the institutional
life of the OSS's successor agencies (Strategic Services Unit and CIA)
in the immediate aftermath of the war. Did the U.S. intelligence establishment
help or hinder the prosecution of the major Nazi criminals at Nuremberg
and the prosecution of lesser perpetrators afterwards? To what degree did
it protect assets who had once served the Nazi regime to the detriment
of justice? Salter uses newly declassified OSS and CIA records as well
as other newly available sources, such as the papers of Robert Jackson,
U.S. chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, the papers of OSS chief William Donovan,
and the papers of Allen Dulles, OSS station head in Bern, who collected
reams of information on Hitler's Germany.
The book covers several loosely
connected themes. The lengthy section on Donovan's role in the preparation
of the Trial of the Major War Criminals in 1945 does not reveal for the
first time that the OSS played an important role, but it does make clear
the sheer extent of the help that the OSS chief provided in terms of trained
personnel; intelligence analysis of the Nazi state from OSS experts like
Franz Naumann; the location, collection, and translation of key captured
German documents in London; the provision of Dulles's informants from within
Nazi Germany such as Fritz Kolbe, Hans Gisevius, and Fabian von Schlabrendorff;
and even courtroom presentations such as the stirring film used at the
Tribunal, _Nazi Concentration Camps_.Donovan, Salter shows, had an interest
in punishing the guilty almost from the moment OSS was formed in 1942,
and while the U.S. and British diplomatic and military establishments dithered
in arriving at a war crimes policy, Donovan and the OSS Research and Analysis
staff assembled lists of likely defendants while thinking about the laws
under which postwar trials might take place. Donovan, an accomplished legal
mind whose views are often left out of books covering the legal debates
leading to Nuremberg, wanted German trialsunder Allied supervision under
existing German law to avoid later accusations of victor's justice and
_ex post facto_ law, charges that have bedeviled Nuremberg to this day.
He even considered plea
bargains for certain defendants
(including Hermann G?ring and Hjalmar Schacht) on the assumption that they
would reveal much about their former comrades and completely de-legitimize
the Nazi state. Donovan lost these and other arguments and had left his
post as Jackson's top lieutenant by the time the trial started in October
1945. But his role in terms of institutional help from OSS and in terms
of presenting legal alternatives was enormous and indispensable.
The darker side of Salter's book
involves the well-known story of Operation Sunrise--the secret surrender
of May 2, 1945 in Italy arranged between Dulles and SS-Obergruppenf?hrer
Karl Wolff, Heinrich Himmler's one-time chief of staff and Higher SS and
Police Leader Italy. Dulles presented the story very carefully after the
war and it made the reputation upon which his future career in the CIA
was built. Wolff, according to Dulles, was an idealistic soldier who risked
his life to spare thousands of combat-related deaths, while Dulles himself
skillfully brought the negotiations to fruition.[4] The mysteries concern
what Dulles really knew about Wolff and the degree to which Wolff and his
subordinates were promised and then given legal immunity from prosecution.
Earlier literature has shown that Dulles was fully aware of the scale of
German atrocities even as he took up residence in Bern.[5] Salter shows
that Dulles was likely aware as early as 1944 of Wolff's complicity in
the deportation of Italian Jews, bloody reprisals against more than nine
thousand Italiancivilians, and many more war crimes. Many of the documents
in question were used at the Trial of the Major War Criminals itself.
As for legal immunity, such could
only be mentioned under the vague rubric of "honorable treatment," since
President Roosevelt would not consider such quid pro quos after 1944. Yet
whatever this state of affairs meant, Wolff insisted on full compensation
after the war. Salter's best work concerns Dulles's various interventions
to protect Wolff from prosecution lest Wolff, whose extensive crimes would
come out at trial, also spill the details of the entire Sunrise affair,
endangering Dulles's reputation and the institutional life of the OSS while
providing the Soviets and Italian communists with anti-American fodder.
Wolff was thus never prosecuted at Nuremberg, either at the international
trial or the subsequent American ones; he was not
handed over to the Italians or to
the Czechs, though both countries wanted him; and the British, at U.S.
insistence, rigged Wolff's 1948 German denazification hearing in Hamburg
so that little incriminating material would be revealed and so that Wolff
would receive minimal punishment. Salter includes fascinating material
on the writing and rewriting of defense affidavits for the Hamburg trial
aimed at getting everyone's Sunrise stories straight while omitting Wolff's
crimes as well as the anti-communist aspect of the Sunrise negotiations.
Wolff settled into a comfortable postwar life until
West German authorities tried him
in 1964. With no occupation authorities left to protect him, the full measure
of his guilt came out, though owing to age and illness he escaped the punishment
he deserved.
The remainder of Salter's book covers
the convoluted tales of Wolff's subordinates, including the dangerous SD
agent, Guido Zimmer, and the
more foppish SS translator, Eugen
Dollmann. Zimmer was hired as an American counterintelligence agent in
Italy and Germany and given a false past that included helping rather than
smashing Italian resisters and which omitted his anti-Jewish measures in
Milan. He was always a security risk. Dollmann was briefly hired and then
simply protected by U.S. intelligence because he would prove an embarrassment
if ever tried by the Italian authorities. As time went on, opinions varied
within the U.S. intelligence community about whether protecting such men
was worth the risk and bother. But the story of Dulles's aplomb with Sunrise
was, for the time being,protected.
Salter's book will appeal to scholars
of wartime intelligence and postwar justice. The book tends to emphasize
relationships between American and British agencies in the lead-up to the
Nuremberg trial, while giving less attention to the roles of the Soviets,
the French, and the United Nations War Crimes Commission, all of whom had
opinions on the politics of postwar justice and espionage. The book isimportant
for what it tells us about the multifaceted and nuanced relationship between
intelligence and justice, for its incorporation of the OSS into the narrative
of the pre-history of the Nuremberg Trials, and for its new revelations
on the long afterlife of Operation Sunrise.
Notes
[1]. Christopher Simpson, _Blowback:
The First Full Account of America's Recruitment of Nazis and Its Disastrous
Effect on Our Domestic and Foreign Policy_ (New York: Weidenfeld and Nicholson,
1988); and Burton Hersh, _The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins
of the CIA_ (New York: Scribner, 1992).
[2]. Richard Breitman et al., _U.S.
Intelligence and the Nazis_ (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
[3]. "CIA Report on Bosnia Blames
Serbs for 90% of the War Crimes,"_The New York Times_, 9 March 1995.
[4]. Allen W. Dulles, _The Secret
Surrender: The Classic Insider'sAccount of the Secret Plot to Surrender
Northern Italy during World War II_ (New York: The Lyons Press, 2006).
The scholarly account is Bradley F. Smith and Elena Agarossi, _Operation
Sunrise: The Secret Surrender_ (New York: Basic Books, 1979).
[5]. Breitman et al., _U.S. Intelligence_,
24-30.Citation: Norman J.W. Goda. Review of Salter, Michael, _Nazi War
Crimes: Intelligence Agencies and Selective Legal Accountability_.H-German,
H-Net Reviews. March, 2009.
URL:
http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=23948
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